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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF ROY, UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 920088CA

MELVIN MURPHY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION BY JURY OF GUILTY DATED
JANUARY 14,
1992,
ROY
CIRCUIT
COURT,
HONORABLE JUDGE DUTSON PRESIDING
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Court empowered

by 78-21-3 Court of Appeals

Jurisdiction;

specifically, 78-2a-3(d) Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In this case there is only one issue.
different manners.

It can be approached in

Specifically however, at the trial of Defendant

a weak case was bolstered by allowing medical testimony of Eric
Froerer.

Mr. Froerer is a fire fighter and paramedic employed by

Roy City, Plaintiff.
In his capacity Mr. Froerer took confidential information from
Defendant Melvin Murphy regarding his physical condition while Mr.
Murphy was in a custodial circumstance and badly injured in a motor
vehicle

accident.

At

no

time

was

Defendant

told

that

this

information which was elicited from him would be used in a criminal
trial.

It

was

admitted

against

strenuous

objection,

which

objection is page 4, 5 and 6 of the testimony of Eric Froerer
1

(Record of testimony of Eric Froerer filed in this Court).
testimony was allowed by Judge Dutson.

The

A jury convicted Mr. Murphy

of DUI on Janaury 14, 1992.
This

certain

prejudicial

evidence

was

introduced,

which

evidence should have been excluded on three grounds, as well as its
prejudicial effect.
there

sufficient

Only because this evidence was introduced was
evidence

to

convict

Mr.

Murphy

since

a

substantially plausible alternate story* was presented to the jury
and because

of

the

improperly

prejudicial

statements

of

Eric

Froerer, Appellant submits he was convicted.
Since the decision to admit the medical technician's testimony
was a question of law on the issue of witnesses, it would appear
that

the

Standard

of

Review

for

both

issues

relating

to

admissibility of the evidence would be where the appeal presents
only questions of law, the Court will review trial Court's rulings
for correctness and accord them no particular deference Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah
1982);

See

also

Ron

Case

Roofing

and

Asphalt

Paving

Co.

v.

Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated 78-24-8 Privileged Communications and
Utah Code Annotated 26-25-1 Confidential Information Release et.
seg. Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence in Utah.

*Mr. Murphy was a painter coming hone from work and the smell of paint and paint thinner were around him in the
car,

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue at a crucially balanced trial was the question which
was presented to the Judge and appears before this Court in the
record entitled "Testimony of Eric Froerer" filed with this Court.
Summarizing Mr. Froerer's testimony, he was a medical technician
and paramedic fire fighter (R:8 et. sea, for job description) and
hired by Roy City (R:8) and interviewed Melvin Murphy with respect
to his

level

of consciousness

after

an accident

occurred

and

assessed him on several scales and stated (R.16) "[t]hat there was
a strong odor of alcohol that was coming from Mr. Murphy's breath"
according to Mr. Froerer.
On page 18 of the Record, on direct examination Mr. Davis
cunningly elicits from Paramedic Froerer, who was investigating Mr.
Murphy in his official capacity, "that you asked him questions
about his drinking" and Paramedic Froerer indicated that "he had
just left a bar and that he'd had a few drinks".

And although

Paramedic Froerer is not offered as "an expert" (R.14-19), still
Paramedic Froerer is permitted to testify against Mr. Murphy in a
semi expert position to indicate that he believed the problems were
alcohol, though he did not indicate alcohol at the time of the
arrest (See Record at page 24:8-11) and acknowledged that the car
which had the accident, a car driven by Defendant, was full of
vapor and fumes from the paint supplies which Defendant used in his
profession.
All
Defendant

the

technical

showed

are

matters

relating

without

foundation
3

to

the
of

deficit
medical

which
skills

s u f f i c i e n t to make such an opinion, but may have been admissible i f
Defendant wished to show that

the

abrasion to h i s head in

the

accident had d i s o r i e n t e d him, but are not f a i r l y submitted before
a

jury

with

no

Miranda,** type

foundation,
grounds

and

over

where a S t a t e

strenuous
agent

is

objections

on

questioning

an

i n d i v i d u a l under a r r e s t by an a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e agency, by the f a c t
that

t h e s e medical

required

in

the

records should been kept c o n f i d e n t i a l

afore

quoted

Confidential

Information

as

is

Release

S e c t i o n of the Utah Code which holds that l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s u n l e s s
excluded, and that h e a l t h information i s not to be r e l e a s e d ,

and

that a Defendant has the right to request that h e a l t h information
obtained

on him should

not

be

used

against

him without

his

permission.
Absent Paramedic F r o e r e r ' s damning s e m i - o f f i c i a l
it

is

surely clear

indictments,

to see that Melvin Murphy may not have been

convicted by a jury in t h i s matter.

The stamp of o f f i c i a l d o m of

Paramedic Froerer and h i s "non expert opinions" had on the
against

Defendant's

presumption of

innocence,

surely

prejudice against Defendant and denies him a f a i r

jury

creates

a

trial.

The Court in Miranda concluded "unless adequate

protective

d e v i c e s are employed to d i s p e l the compulsion inherent in c u s t o d i a l
surroundings, no statement obtained from defendant can t r u l y be the
product of free c h o i c e .

There was no i n t e l l i g e n t waiver by Mr.

Murphy, the circumstances were such that he was in the control of
**the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v, Arizona concluded that even without resort to brutality , , . custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy tool on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. Also, that even
if i t might not find that the Defendant's statements were involuntary in traditional terms, if the defendant :s
not apprised of his rights in this s i t u a t i o n , we can be never sure the statements were a product of free choice.
384 U.S. 435 36 S.Ct. 1602 16 L.Ed.2d 594 1966.
4

Mr.

Froerer

and

clearly

in

this

testimony of Paramedic Froerer

case

on Miranda

grounds

should not have been

the

permitted.

Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence in Utah declare that although
relevant, evidence may
substantially

outweighed

be excluded
by

the

if

its probative

danger

of

unfair

value

is

prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . . Clearly in
this case, this testimony was ultimately prejudicial to Appellant.
As stated above, Defendant had the right by three (3) separate
methods of demanding that the objectionable testimony of Paramedic
Froerer be kept out of consideration of the jury.

Despite these

objections Paramedic Froererfs testimony was admitted and his "non
expert" opinion relating to Defendant was put before the jury.
Specifically,

(1) Defendant

had

the right

to protect

his

medical records, (2) to invoke the medical privilege, and (3) the
right to exclude his civil statements to a state agent while in
custody.

Regarding custodial interrogation, See Record at page 13

where Paramedic

Froerer

says he was

taking

responsibility

for

Defendant; specifically, line 21, "my main concern was getting him
out of the cold and into the ambulance, where I can do a full
assessment, 'cause, you know, the conditions of that car, it was
smashed into a truck, he's in a bad position, he's in a compact
position,
And

....
continuing

on page 15 of

the Record, where Roy City

Paramedic Froerer says "as soon as I found out he was conscious and
breathing, I went with my equipment into the ambulance, ready to
set

up,

came

back,

helped

them
5

with

a

back

board

and

the

extrication equipment to get him into the ambulance.
further assess him".

So we could

(R.15:2-6).

Defendant asserts his medical privilege on page 16 of the
Record.
Apellant maintains this is an abuse of discretion.
Appellant also believes this error constitutes grounds for
reversal because

there

is a reasonable

likelihood that

a more

favorable result would have been obtained by Mr. Murphy in the
absence of this error.

See Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671

P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
The error was not a harmless one and requires reversal and a
new trial with the paramedic's testimony excluded.

ARGUMENT
This case raises a question of whether or not a city employee
can give medical statements given while a citizen is in custody in
a criminal proceeding, against the wishes of Defendant who is being
tried in a criminal matter relating thereto.

It seems clear to

Defendant that the power of a public official speaking at a public
trial

on

his

opinion

Defendant strenuously

cannot

be

overestimated.

objected to Roy City

This

Paramedic

is

why

Froerer's

testimony and why the Roy City Prosecutor thought it was essential .

STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant

requests

a new

trial

in

this

matter

with

the

testimony of Roy City Paramedic Froerer excluded on the grounds
6

herein above urged.
°^ ^

^ ^ DATED this

day of November, 1992

ROBERT MACRI
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I mailed four copies of the foregoing to:
CRIS DAVIS, Esq.
Roy City Prosecutor
5051 South 1900 West
Roy, Utah 84067
on/ferhas
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day of November,

1992.
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A-d(tu^dMyinA^
78-21-3. Court to decide q u e s t i o n s of law. ".|J
All questions of law, including the admissibility J
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, (k|
construction of statutes and other writings, and tin
application of the rules of evidence are to be decidd
by the court and all discussions of law addressed toil
Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law mA
evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knoJ
edge to the jury, who are bound to accept it.
v mk

78-24-8. Privileged c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
There are particular relations in which it is the
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the following cases:
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either during the marriage or afterwards be,
without the consent of the other, examined
as to any communication made by one to the
other during the marriage.
(b) This exception does not apply:
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by
one spouse against the other;
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding
for a crime committed by one spouse
against the other;
(iii) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to support a spouse or child;
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for abuse or neglect committed
against the child of either spouse; or
(v) if otherwise specifically provided
by law.
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him or his advice given
regarding the communication in the course of his
professional employment. An attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be examined,
without the consent of his employer, concerning
any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in his capacity as an employee.
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the
consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to him in his
professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which he belongs.
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending
the patient which was necessary to enable him to
prescribe or act for the patient. However, this
privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the
patient in an action in which the patient places

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice,' confusion, or
waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

his medical condition at issue as an eleau_,
factor of his claim or defense. Under thoeej
cumstances, a physician or surgeon who half
scribed for or treated that patient for the met
condition at issue may provide information
terviews, reports, records, statements, m~
randa, or other data relating to the patL
medical condition and treatment whid$
placed at issue.
(5) A public officer cannot be examined!
communications made to him in official cadence when the public interests would suffer!
the disclosure.
••WJ
(6) A sexual assault counselor as definedl
Section 78-3c-3 cannot, without the consentj
the victim, be examined in a civil or criii
proceeding as to any confidential communia
as defined in Section 78-3c-3 made by the vid

Any health care provider who intentionally or
knowingly violates any provision of Section 26-23a-2
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
i»88
C H A P T E R 24

LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT ACT
( R e n u m b e r e d by Laws 1990, ch. 186, §§ 889 to
913.)
26-24-1 to 26-24-24. R e n u m b e r e d as §§ 17A-3501 to 17A-3-525.
C H A P T E R 25
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RELEASE
Section
26-25-1.
26-25-2.
26-25-3.
26-25-4.
26-25-5.
26-25-6.
26-25-1.

Authority to provide data on treatment
and condition of persons to designated
agencies — Immunity from liability.
Restrictions on use of data.
Information considered privileged communications.
Information held in confidence — Protection of identities.
Violation of chapter a misdemeanor —
Civil liability.
Confidentiality requirements regarding
communicable or reportable diseases.

Authority to provide data o n treatment
and condition of persons to d e s i g n a t e d
a g e n c i e s — Immunity from liability.
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring liability, provide the following information to the persons and entities described in Subsection (2):
(a) information, including information required for the medical and health section of birth
certificates, as determined by the state registrar
of vital records appointed under Chapter 2;
(b) interviews;
(c) reports;
(d) statements;
(e) memoranda; and
(f) other data relating to the condition and
treatment of any person.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1)
may be provided to:
(a) the department;
(b) the Division of Mental Health within the
Department of Human Services;
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institutions of higher education;
(d) the Utah State Medical Association or any
of its allied medical societies;
(e) peer review committees;
(0 professional review organizations;
(g) professional societies and associations; and
(h) any health facility's in-house stall committee for the uses described in Subsection (3).
(3) The information described in Subsection (1)
may be provided for the following purposes:
(a) study, with the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality; or
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by hospitals, health
facilities, or health care providers.
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability,
provide information, interviews, reports, statements,

memoranda, or other information relating to the ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer review
committees, professional societies and associations, or
any in-hospital staff committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline.
(5) No liability may arise against any person or
organization as a result of:
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section;
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in this section to
advance health research and health education; or
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these
studies in accordance with this chapter.
(6) As used in this chapter:
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set
forth in Subsection 78-14-3(9); and
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set
forth in Section 26-21-2.
1990
26-25-2. Restrictions o n use of data.
The department, the Division of Mental Health
within the Department of Human Services, scientific
and health care research organizations affiliated with
institutions of higher education, the Utah State Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies,
peer review committees, professional review organizations, professional societies and associations, or any
health facility's in-house staff committee may only
use or publish the material received or gathered under Section 26-25-1 for the purpose of advancing medical research or medical education in the interest of
reducing morbidity or mortality, except that a summary of studies conducted in accordance with Section
26-25-1 may be released by those groups for general
publication.
1990
26-25-3.

Information
considered
privileged
communications.
All information, including information required for
the medical and health section of birth certificates as
determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Chapter 2, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data furnished by reason
of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are privileged communications and may not be used or received in evidence in
any legal proceeding of any kind or character.
1989
26-25-4.

Information held in confidence — Protection of identities.
All information, including information required for
the medical and health section of birth certificates as
determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Chapter 2, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data so provided shall be
held in strict confidence by the person or organization
to which it is provided, and any use, release, or publication resulting therefrom shall be made so as to preclude identification of any person or persons studied.
1989

26-125-5.

Violation of chapter a misdemeanor —
Civil liability.
(1) Any use, release or publication, negligent or
otherwise, contrary to the provisions of this chapter
shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not relieve the person or
organization responsible for such use, release, or publication from civil liability.
1991

INSTRUCTION NO.

All

presumptions

of

law,

independent of evidence, are in

favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is

proved

guilty

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

In case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
the defendant is entitled to a not guilty verdict.

%

I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond
beyond a

reasonable doubt

a reasonable

doubt.

Proof

does not require proof to an absolute

certainty.

By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on

reason and

one which

It must be a
fanciful

reasonable doubt

or

possibility.

is reasonable in view of all the evidence.

imaginary

or

and not
based

on

Proof beyond a reasonable

a doubt
a

which is merely

wholly

doubt is

speculative

that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act
all

reasonable

doubt.

conscientiously upon
A

reasonable

doubt

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it

it and obviates
is a doubt which
must arise from

the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.

/

t-r\

INSTRUCTION NO.

You

are

witnesses

the

and

exclusive

the

credibility of

weight

judges
of

the witnesses

the

if any,

evidence.

their

in the

any

they do,

witness

deportment

if any

contradicted
upon

the

or the

want of

himself

witness

it, their

which

you

judging the

if

any

is shown,

motive or

lack thereof to

You may consider whether

or

herself,

the witnesses'

stand, the reasonableness or lack
their apparent

frankness or candor

opportunity to know, their ability to

understand, their capacity to
circumstance

bias,

is shown.

thereof of their statements,

In

result of the lawsuit either as

parties or otherwise, or any probable
testify as

the credibility of the

and the weight of their testimony,

you can take into consideration
their interest,

of

remember

believe

may

and

any

have

a

other
bearing

truthfulness or accuracy of the statements of witnesses.
consider any
accordance

on

the

You may

or all of these factors and determine therefrom, in
with

credibility

fact or

you

your

honest

should

give

convictions,

what

weight

and

to the testimony of each witness,

measured by reason and common sense

and the

rules set

forth in

these instructions.
The

testimony

statements on
matters.

of

one matter

So if

a

witness
may thus

you believe

known

to

be less

a witness

falsely as to any material fact in this

have

made

false

convincing on other

has willfully testified
case, you

may disregard

the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it

/ < ^^\

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page Two

such weight

as you

think it is entitled to.

witnesses 1

testimony

or

witnesses,

if

do

any,

between
not

discrediting of testimony.
misrecollection might

occur.

in

the

Discrepancies in a

testimony

themselves

Innocent failure

of

different

necessitate

the

of recollection or

Furthermore, two witnesses to the

same event might perceive the event differently.

£^1

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, ROY DEPARTMENT
:Y OF ROY
Plaintiff
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CASE NO: 912001982 TC
iVIN MURPHY
Defendant
! ROLE OF THE JURY
A. INSTRUCTING THE JURY about the law which applies to this case is one
my duties as judge. At various times during the trial I will read to you
tain instructions which explain your duties as jurors and the principles of
which will guide your decision, A written copy of these instructions will
given to you to use in the jury room. You have a duty to follow these
tructions.
B. THE INSTRUCTIONS should be CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE. Just because
e instructions are given first, or last, doesn't mean they deserve any more
ention than any other instruction. Do not single out any part and ignore
rest. Consider them as equally important.
C. QUESTIONS OF FACT are for the jury to decide. The main question
will decide is whether the defendant is guilty of the charges in the
ormation. In making this decision, do not be influenced by your emotions,
ther you like or dislike the defendant should not affect your verdict. The
t that the defendant may have been arrested or summoned, or charged in any
ormation, or brought to trial should not be considered by you as any
dence of guilt. The defendant is presumed to be innocent.
D. RECESSES will be called from time to time during the trial. During
recess do not talk about this case among yourselves, or with anyone else.
not form or express an opinion until the case is submitted to you for
ision. Keep an open mind until you have heard both sides.

CEMENTS BY JUDGE AND ATTORNEYS
A. OPENING STATEMENTS may be made by counsel on both sides to give you
review of what they expect their witnesses to say. Counsel will also make
sing arguments at the end of the trial. These statements and arguments by
isel are not evidence. Their purpose is to help you understand and analyze
evidence.
B.
true.

A STIPULATION is an agreement by both attorneys that certain things
You should regard any stipulated facts as having been conclusively

ved.
C.

OBJECTIONS may be made to particular questions which will be asked

ing the trial, if the objecting attorney believes that answer would not be
issible evidence.
the jury

There are rules to determine what evidence is competent

to consider.

ection is made.

These

rules are enforced

If an objection is overruled, that means the evidence can

le in, and it may be considered by you.
dence is kept out.
r

by the court after an

If an objection is sustained, the

Do not speculate about the reasons for objections, or

the court rules one way or the other.
D.

THE PERSONAL OPINIONS of myself as judge, or of the attorneys in

LS case are immaterial.

We are officers of the court.

: any of us to express or to

imply

It would not be fair

any personal opinion as to guilt or

locence, or any other issue in the case.

If any of my statements or rulings

am to indicate my opinion on any fact, this is not intended and you should
sregard it.
E.
THE EVIDENCE in this case will consist of testimony by witnesses
3er oath, exhibits admitted by the court, and stipulations of counsel. You
e the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must determine the facts from
e evidence produced here in court.
You should act conscientiously and
irly in weighing this evidence to reach a just verdict, regardless of what
e consequences of such a verdict may be.

GIVEN_
NOT GI

SSUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF, REASONABLE DOUBT
A. A DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED INNOCENT until each element of the offense
irge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt of
i defendant's guilty your findings must be Mnot guilty".
B. THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING the defendant guilty
ond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence follows the defendant
ough the trial until the prosecution has met this burden.
C. A REASONABLE DOUBT is a doubt based on reason. It is substantial
bt which remains after reviewing all the evidence. It may be created by
evidence, or it may arise from the lack of evidence. Beyond a reasonable
bt does not mean beyond all possible doubt/ or beyond any possibility of
or.
D. YOU HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT, if you can honestly say you are not
isfied of the defendant's guilt/ after reviewing all the evidence.
E. YOU DO NOT HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT if you can honestly say you are
mly convinced of the defendant's guilt/ after reviewing all the evidence,
that you have no real questions of his/her guilt.
F. IF TWO INTERPRETATIONS can be made from the evidence ^in this case,
if one of these interpretations points to guilt and the other to
oncence of the defendant/ it is your duty to adopt the interpretation
nting to innocence. This rule applies only when both interpretations are
sonable.

GIVEN
NOT GIVEN

' DELIBERATIONS
A. WHEN YOU GO TO THE JURY ROOM to discuss this case and arrive at a
lict, the first thing you should do is choose a member of the jury to act
foreperson. The foreperson will preside over your discussions and will
1 the verdict to which you must all agree. Since this is a criminal case,
verdict must be unanimous, must be in writing, and must be brought back
D court.
B. YOUR VERDICT must express the individual opinion of each juror,
n you have made up your mind whether the defendant is guilty or innocent,
't change it just because other jurors may disagree with you. Talk to your
low jurors and consider their views. If you are persuaded your first
elusion was wrong, don't hesitate to change it. Remember your duty as
ors is to help each other in arriving at the truth.
C. YOU WILL BE GIVEN forms of verdict to use in this case. Your
reperson will sign the verdict which correctly sets forth your decision.
ONLY THE FOREPERSON HAS TO SIGN THE VERDICT. When you have agreed on a
edict, tell the bailiff you are ready to return to court.

i

GIVEN.
NOT GIVEN

FNESSES
A. THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS means deciding whether the witness is
:thy of belief. In analyzing credibility, it may be helpful to ask yourself
>se questions:
What impression is made by the witness1 appearance and manner of
testifying?
Has the witness made conflicting statements, or given testimony which
is contrary to other evidence?
Is the witness shown to be biased for or against one of the parties, or
does the witness have a personal interest in how this case is decided?
Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts in the first
place, and the ability to remember them at this time?
Is the witness* story reasonable in light of human experience?
.ng these guidelines, you should determine the credibility, and what weight
L should give to the testimony of each witness.
B. CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE may arise in several ways. It is common
iwledge that two witnesses to the same event may tell different versions of
One may have been a better observer or may have a better memory. For
sonal reasons, a witness may slant his or her testimony, either consciously
unconsciously. You should try to reconcile such conflicts and decide what
i true facts are.
C. IF YOU THINK A WITNESS HAS LIED about any material fact, you are
e to disregard all the testimony from that witness, or give it what weight
think it deserves. You don't have to believe any witness whose testimony
not reasonable in view of all the facts.
D. THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES on each side does not, in itself, indicate
ch side has the stronger case. You may believe one witness against many,
many witnesses against a few, depending on what you find their credibility
be.
E. THE DEFENDANT is a competent witness on his own behalf. If he
oses to testify, his testimony should be given the same consideration as
give to that of any other witness. The defendant has a constitutional
ht not to testify. If he chooses not to do so, you should not consider
s as having any bearing on his guilty or innocence.

Sh

GIVEN
NOT GIVEN

F
THE ELEMENTS of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of
1 are as follows, which elements must be proven beyond a reasonable

That the defendant was driving, or in actual physical control,
of a motor vehicle on November 2, 1991; at or near 5600 South
Frontage Road, Roy City, Weber County, Utah, while under the
influence of alcohol.

GIVEN
NOT GIVEN

G. ONE IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL within the meaning of the law
n it has so far affected his brain and nervous system to impair to an
reciable degree his abilities of perception, coordination, or of will or
gment, so that he is unable to operate his automobile with the degree of
e which an ordinary person in the possession of his faculties would
rcise under similar circumstances.

GIVEN.
NOT GIVEN

Instruction No.
You are instructed that the fact a person refuses to take a blood
or breath test is no evidence of his guilt or innocence regarding the
charge of DUI but is merely a fact that you may consider along with all
other evidence with respect to the weight and credibility you give it.

THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED with the offense of Driving Under the
iluence of Alcohol/Drugs, in violation of Ch. 41-6-44 of the Roy City
iicipal Code, on November 2, 1991.

GIVEN.
NOT GIVEN

MAR 2 3 1992
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT - ROY
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ROY CITY
VS

JUDGMENT,

(COMMITMENT)

MURPHY, MELVIN
4189 SOUTH 300 WEST
#62
OGDEN

CIRCUIT COURT
ROY CITY DEPARTMENT
SENTENCE

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:

UT

912001982
10/28/57
3R775 COUNT: 0691
01/14/92

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDICATED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
300.00
Jail: 90 DA
Susp: 88 DA
ACS:
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TRACKING:
Appeal

60 HR

0.00

Due:

378.38

0.00

Due:

321.62

0.00

Due:

700.00

08/10/92

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
TAPE: 3R775
COUNT: 0691
Chrg: DUI
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine Amount:
1000.00
Suspended:
300.00
Jail:
90 DAYS
Suspended
88 DAYS
Community Service:
60 HOURS
378.38
Fines and assessments entered: FN
321.62
SB
700.00
Total fines and assessments..:
Conditions of Probation: 18 months informal Court Probation
JAIL/FINE SUSP UPON PYMT OF FINE AND COMPLIANCE W/ALL ORDERS.
1) ENROLL IN/COMPLETE ALC COUNSELING PROG THROUGH ROCKY MTN CONSULTANTS AND PAY ALL COSTS REQUIRED 2) PERFORM 60 HRS OF COM
SER THROUGH ROCKY MTN CONSULTANTS 3) CONSUME NO ALC/DRG 4) VIOLATE NO LAW EXCEPT MINOR TRAFFIC IF LEGAL TO DRIVE 5) ATTEND
MIN OF 1 A/A PER WEEK (NOTE: COURT IS NOT ASKING FOR MONTHLY
PROOF, BUT WOULD LIKE IT MADE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUESTED) 6) DEF

TO REPORT TO WCJ AT 6 PM ON 1/24/92 FOR 48 HRS. DEF TO PAY
$100/MONTH COMMENCING 2/15/92. REVIEW OF FINE IS SET FOR
8/20/92 AT 1:30 PM, BUT IF DEF CANNOT MAKE PYMTS HE NEEDS TO
CONTACT CLERKS OFFICE ASAP TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGMENTS.
DEF'S CONVICTION IS ENTERED.
CALENDAR:
REV FINE scheduled for

8/20/92 at

1:30 P in room 1 with RSD

BY TH

NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 days
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

